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HONG KONG-CHINA LEGAL SYNERGY IN THE
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DANIEL R. FUNG, Q.C., J.P.*
I am delighted and honoured to be here this evening, and if
that famous Flemish mystic philosopher Maurice Maeterinck was
correct in characterizing dinnertime as constituting the climax to
the day, I am a little tempted, perversely, to render my speech an
anti-climax. I am inclined to that approach because, in essence, a
subject such as the law ought to be boring. The law ought to be
boring because we rely on the law for its inherent stability, for its
implicit promise of continuity, and we rely on it as a cornerstone
supporting our society's civic development and material prosperi-
ty. Hong Kong does not appear to subscribe to this theory in
light of the fact that, fortunately or otherwise, we have had more
than our fair share of excitement, particularly over the last decade
and a half. In short, we seemed determined to live out the so-
called ancient Chinese curse of living in interesting times.
So what makes Hong Kong tick? Just before I took the flight
over here, I picked up a copy of the Asian Wall Street Journal
which publishes, periodically, an update on confidence determi-
nants in Hong Kong. What they do is assess concrete evidence
such as investment levels, capital inflows and outflows, and
immigration and emigration figures, as opposed to merely taking
the proverbial pulses of the people of Hong Kong or, for that
matter, taking the pulses of editorial opinion writers in New
York.
And this is what they had to say: that in every sector they
have examined, starting with the stock market, the property
market and currency deposits in Hong Kong dollars as opposed to
U.S. dollars, moving onto figures for retail sales, net immigration
into Hong Kong, the number of foreign firms located in or
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establishing regional headquarters in Hong Kong, every sector
(save only for the stock market which has posted a minor
correction over the month of March) has actually hit record highs,
indeed, record highs for all time. For example, as regards the
property market, we have now reached the stage whereby a
typically modest medium-sized apartment of 1,500 square feet in
Hong Kong now commands a breathtaking average price of US$2
million, representing an increase of sixty percent over the price of
the same property in January 1996.
So far as concerns currency deposits, we have seen a record
high of currency deposits being held in Hong Kong dollars with
a corresponding decline of those held in foreign currencies. In
terms of foreign firms establishing a presence in Hong Kong,
February 1997 shows an absolute record of nearly 4650 major
overseas firms establishing regional headquarters in Hong Kong.
Regarding immigration inflow and emigration outflow from Hong
Kong, we have seen a dramatic drop in emigration levels whereby
emigration figures for 1996 are lower than in any year since the
Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. So far as the stock market is
concerned, Hong Kong peaked in January of this year. We have
come down slightly in March to around 13,600 on the Hang Seng
Index, which is higher than at any time in 1996. And the only
reason for the slight revision in stock prices is the perception that
interest rates in the United States may go up. In other words, our
stock market appears to rise or fall according to the decisions of
Alan Greenspan: now his views are clearly not coloured by
considerations of 1997. And I suppose that observation under-
scores a piece of folk wisdom which has gained currency in Hong
Kong, namely, that Hong Kong does not really have a monetary
policy since, by reason of the Hong Kong dollar being pegged to
the U.S. dollar, Hong Kong's monetary policy is actually set by
the Federal Reserve in the United States!
I mention all of the above by way of relevant background, and
some of you who may have heard me speak in Washington D.C.
in December last year may be forgiven a sense of deja vu because
at the end of 1996, I looked at the same confidence determinants
laid down by the Asian Wall Street Journal and they show more
or less the same picture, the current trend starting with an
upswing as from January of 1996. So what explains this phenome-
non? What explains, more importantly, the apparent sharp
difference between actual economic commitments and investment
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levels in Hong Kong and some of the more popular throwaway
sentiments you might read about in, for example, the New York
Times or Fortune Magazine which predicted, I think somewhat
prematurely, the death of Hong Kong in August 1995.
What explains, in short, the divergence between media views
and those of the people who put their money where their mouths
are. As the Asian Wall Street Journal reminds us, even taking into
account such factors as short term greed and a bit of carpetbag-
ging, perhaps, in the run-up to 1997, the level of foreign invest-
ment in Hong Kong reveals a striking picture. Given human
nature and our present knowledge of the behavioural sciences,
people do not go around committing so much money - and it is
mostly overseas money - to a particular market if there is
something fundamentally wrong with it. So what is Hong
Kong's secret? I think that question is worth examining in some
detail and the way I propose to do this is to go back to basics
(apologies to John Major), to look at what has guaranteed and
reinforced our continuous growth and prosperity throughout the
transition and thereafter to peek over the time horizon to see
whether those factors will survive beyond June 30, 1997.
Hong Kong has had the benefit of arguably the longest orderly
transfer of sovereignty in human history. We started our journey
in 1982 and we will finish this pilgrimage in about 100 days from
today. One of the great advantages of a long transition is that we
have been able to use the last fifteen years as a kind of decompres-
sion chamber. By that notion, I mean that as we ascend gradual-
ly, like deep sea divers, to the surface to embrace the actual
transfer of sovereignty, we have been able to pause periodically,
to monitor our progress, to prognosticate as to what lies ahead
and, in the course of undertaking these series of stock-taking
exercises, we can usefully identify five milestones which have
marked our passage and which act also as harbingers of things to
come.
These five milestones are worth remembering. They can be
represented in terms of time by the years 1982, 1984, 1990, 1991,
and 1995. 1982 marks the beginning of our journey. In that year,
the P.R.C. Constitution underwent its fourth metamorphosis.
1982 was also four years after Deng Xiaoping's accession to
power, six years after the official termination of the Cultural
Revolution. By 1982, domestic pressures in China mandated the
revision of its Constitution to meet social and economic develop-
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ments resulting from the introduction of 'market socialism' as
state policy. One article appeared in the 1982 P.R.C. Constitution
never previously seen, namely, Article 31. This provides that
"[t]he state may establish special administrative regions when
necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative
regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National
People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions."
Now that, as all of you recognize, is the constitutional
reduction of Deng Xiaoping's famous dictum, "one country, two
systems." I mentioned that as marking the beginning of our
journey because it is often forgotten that "one country, two
systems" is not the result of Sino-British negotiations but consti-
tutes rather the blueprint - a home-grown blueprint - for the
future governance of Hong Kong after the resumption of Chinese
sovereignty over the territory laid down before Sino-British
negotiations actually began. It must always be born in mind that
although the P.R.C. Constitution was actually amended or under-
went its fourth metamorphosis in December of 1982, debate over
"one country, two systems" long preceded 1982.
Assuming the recollection of one of our former Governors,
Lord MacLehose, as recounted in a recent interview he gave to
one of Hong Kong's leading dailies to be accurate, Deng
Xiaoping broached with him the "one country, two systems"
concept as early as 1979. This confirms our general understanding
that the formula "one country, two systems" underwent its
gestation in the late 1970s and became crystallized as state policy
in the early 1980s. I am sure you recall that the "one country,
two systems" doctrine was originally cast as the silver bullet for
disposing of the seemingly monstrous obstacles to the lofty goal
of peaceful reunification with Taiwan. Now Taiwan came first on
the agenda of national unification in the 1979/80 period. By 1981,
however, priorities had changed whereby Hong Kong became the
focus for the implementation of the formula. Hong Kong then
took precedence over Taiwan as a case for experimentation. By
1982, the doctrine was ripe for cutting the Gordion knot in Sino-
British negotiations over Hong Kong's future.
Why do I go into all this background? I do so because the
very fact that "one country, two systems" is a Chinese formula -
specifically, Deng's Formula - goes some way towards answering
a persistent and important question nagging Hong Kong residents
and investors, alongside overseas statesmen, business leaders, media
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writers, as well as people like you and me over the last decade and
a half, namely, what is to stop China from tearing up those two
pieces of paper, the Joint Declaration1 and the Basic Law, come
July 1, 1997? What is to stop them from saying: "Actually, we
were just kidding these last thirteen years, let's forget all of this"?
Now whilst many factors must be weighed in the balance in
answering this crucial question, one of the most important is, I
suggest, the inescapable fact that "one country, two systems" is a
Chinese formula. It was not something rammed down China's
throat by a foreign power. It was not even, strictly speaking,
something hammered out as a result of negotiations between two
sovereign states. On the contrary, it is home-grown. It is
something original that China came up with, a fundamental
concept of which China is very proud.
In September 1982, Margaret Thatcher visited Beijing to
inaugurate two years of negotiations over Hong Kong's future.
The catalyst for her visit was the pressing commercial need to
resolve a seemingly intractable problem arising from the reality
that, in the early 1980s, much of Hong Kong's wealth was tied
up in property and the acquisition of property in Hong Kong that
was, in those days, financed by fifteen-year mortgages. By 1982,
a bare fifteen years remained of the ninety-nine-year lease granted
to Victorian Britain by Manchu China under the 1898 Conven-
tion of Peking which covered ninety-eight percent of Hong
Kong's territory including, critically, the international airport and
the manufacturing districts. Time was running out and commer-
cial patience was sorely tested wherefor the two sides had to put
their heads together so as to lance the boil of uncertainty
blemishing the face of Hong Kong's political and economic
future.
As many of you will know from the accounts written of that
period, the initial British position was to make an opening gambit
for an extension of British sovereignty over Hong Kong. That
failed. By 1983, the British fallback was to cede sovereignty to
China but retain a right to British administration over Hong
I Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-
P.R.C., 1985 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd. 9543) [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
2 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1990 (P.R.C.), translated in 29 I.L.M. 1520
(1990) [hereinafter Basic Law].
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Kong for the next one-hundred years. That bid was likewise
unsuccessful and in September 1984 the two sovereign states ended
up full circle at the original Chinese position - by initialing a
treaty known as the Sino-British Joint Declaration which detailed
the formula for the governance of Hong Kong after June 30, 1997,
which was nothing less than "one country, two systems" writ
large.
Those among you who subscribe to the notion, which I
actually regard to be simplistic and false, that the two-year period
of negotiations witnessed repeated British capitulations to Chinese-
held positions, might wish to cite the foregoing history as
evidence to support that particular theory. However, just as we
are often reminded that God is in the details, in reality, the merits
of the Joint Declaration lie in the detailed provisions - supplied
by Britain - which flesh out the "one country; two systems"
formula.
More significantly, "one country, two systems" is a much
broader principle for the governance of China itself. China is the
most populous nation on earth, indeed, in the history of humani-
ty. With a population five times that of the United States but
with only one-third of her arable land, China is, almost by
definition, a country which is well-nigh impossible to govern as
a unitary state. Hence, the search for a magic formula for
governing China which found expression in relation to a prodigal
territory - Hong Kong - is soon to be reincorporated back into
the Chinese polity.
The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration is an agreement which,
in terms of its content and implications, is little short of miracu-
lous. I shall demonstrate why. The Joint Declaration has the
nature of an international treaty. It compels the existing sover-
eign power, Britain, to return sovereignty over Hong Kong to
China, but subject to conditions. Those conditions are spelled out
in the Joint Declaration. And that document is registered with
the United Nations. It has the force of international law. It
binds the incoming sovereign to the outgoing sovereign to respect
the conditions of handover. I do not propose to recite the terms
of the Joint Declaration. I am sure you know them very well and
it is terribly boring for me to read from the little blue book. But
a few provisions are worthy of highlighting.
First and foremost is the provision which says that Hong
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Kong post-1997 will retain its own currency' which is the Hong
Kong dollar, a hard currency and a tool of international trade
pegged to the United States dollar, currently backed-up by US$63
billion of reserves making Hong Kong the second richest per
capita territory anywhere in the world. In absolute terms, in
terms of amount of foreign reserves held, we are ranked number
seven in the world. And this provision means that the renminbi
will not be circulated in Hong Kong. The renminbi will be
treated as foreign currency.
This is backed-up by a related provision which says that Hong
Kong will remain a separate customs territory in international
legal terms.4 As a separate tax area, Hong Kong will enjoy fiscal
autonomy, which means that Hong Kong can collect its own taxes
and remit no taxes whatsoever to the center.' By the same token,
we cannot call upon the center to bail us out if we are ever in
trouble. For every year over the last ten consecutive years, we
have had a budget deficit only in one year and that was shortly
after Tiananmen Square in 1989. Post-1997, deficit budgets will
be rendered unconstitutional.
Other provisions in the Joint Declaration provide that we will
retain our own separate shipping register6 and our own separate
aircraft register." Hong Kong will also enjoy separate internation-
al persona, so that, for example, Hong Kong is a founding
member of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). As you all
know, China is not a member. China is encountering great
difficulty in acceding to the WTO. But whether or not the
P.R.C. succeeds in joining the WTO in 1997 makes no difference
whatsoever to Hong Kong's position. Hong Kong retains its seat
in the WTO. Take another example. Hong Kong is a founding
member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. We sit
alongside China in APEC. Come 1997, we will continue sitting
alongside China in APEC. The only change would be a change
of nomenclature: Hong Kong will be known as "Hong Kong,
China."'
3 See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(7) & annex I S VII.
See id. para. 3(6) & annex I S VI.
5 See id. para. 3(8) & annex I S V.
6 See id. annex I 5 VIII.
7 See id. annex I IX.
' See id. annex I S XI.
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Most significantly of all to my mind is the provision in the
Joint Declaration which says that Hong Kong is to retain its own
separate legal system, which is the common law system This
means that Hong Kong is and will remained locked into the
international grid. The common law forms Britain's proudest
legacy to Hong Kong, bestowed as a result of a century and a half
of colonial rule. The common law has as its most famous
hallmark reliance on a case law system - more significantly, one
which is not purely domestic in nature.
Today, our courts in Hong Kong refer on a regular basis to
decisions not just of our own jurisdiction, but also to those of the
House of Lords in England, the Privy Council, the High Court
of Australia, the Court of Appeal in New Zealand, the Indian
Supreme Court, the South African Supreme Court, the South
African Constitutional Court, the Canadian Supreme Court, the
U.S. Supreme Court, and the U.S. Federal District Courts, to
quote but a few examples. These overseas decisions are cited not,
of course, by way of binding authority but by way of persuasive
precedent on relevant issues arising in the course of litigation.
This will remain the case beyond 1997. Conceivably, in the year
2000, for example, Hong Kong courts may refer to a case decided
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the year 1999 on a relevant issue
for guidance. In this, we will behave no differently from the
other fifty-six common law countries the world over - each of
them independent, sovereign nations which refer, where necessary,
to the learning and jurisprudence of other common law jurisdic-
tions by way of persuasive, though not binding, authority. It is
important to note that, in adopting such conduct, no compromise
to the sovereignty is implied.
Backing up the provision for retention of the common law is
a related provision stipulating that Hong Kong will have its own
separate judicial system with power of final adjudication." What
does this mean? Today, Hong Kong arguably does not yet enjoy
full power of final adjudication because, currently, our court of
last resort remains the Privy Council in London. Now, of all the
issues that divided Britain and China during the 1982 to 1984
period, the question of what to do about the Privy Council after
1997 proved to be one of the most intractable. However, after
9 See id. para. 3(3) & annex I S II.
"0 See id. para. 3(3) & annex I S MII.
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two years of hard negotiations and a bit of ingenuity thrown in,
the architects of the Joint Declaration, namely Britain and China,
must be congratulated for arriving at a solution that was peculiar-
ly imaginative, pragmatic, and unique for Hong Kong.
The solution was to replace the Privy Council, not by a body
in Beijing, even though that was what the doctrine of mirror-
imaging virtually mandated, but to replace the Privy Council by
a Court of Final Appeal ("CFA") located in Hong Kong and
established as a common law court. Further, this Court of Final
Appeal would be a court in which judges from overseas common
law jurisdictions may be invited to sit and participate in delibera-
tions and from which P.R.C. judges will necessarily be excluded
since P.R.C. judges are, ex hypothesi, not common lawyers.
Now, if we should pause here to examine the structure of the
Joint Declaration, we would see something very interesting. We
see the beginnings of an experiment of historic proportions - an
experiment by the People's Republic of China with a form of
government that will go way beyond any federal model in terms
of tolerating separateness and autonomy. Should one care to look
the world over, I think one would be hard-pushed - I myself
would certainly feel hard-pushed - to identify any federal state
which would tolerate an integral part of its sovereign territory
circulating its own exclusive, hard currency and from which the
national currency is excluded from circulating, remitting no taxes
whatsoever to the center, having a legal system which is jurispru-
dentially and philosophically different from the national system,
having its own judiciary fully quarantined from the judiciary of
the larger nation-state, and, finally, having a Court of Final
Appeal with no overarching supreme court imposed on top to
supervise the work of the CFA. Thus, whilst Hong Kong will,
after June 30, 1997, have its own Court of Final Appeal, the rest
of China will have its own Supreme People's Court. None of
the world's great federal nations - neither the United States nor
India nor Germany nor Canada nor Australia - have ever experi-
mented with a system of this nature.
The Joint Declaration is remarkable in two other respects
worthy of note. First, it contains an annex known as Annex I.
This is a document whereby China commits itself in writing to
spelling out its detailed policies towards the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. This document is longer than the Joint
Declaration itself and is also registered with the United Nations.
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It also operates under international law binding China to Britain
and vice-versa. Annex I repeats the salient features of Joint
Declaration but goes into greater detail. For example, in Part XIII
to Annex I, China commits itself to having the provisions of the
two most comprehensive, multilateral human rights treaties ever
sponsored by the United Nations, namely, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR'), and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR") continue to apply to Hong Kong post-1997. This is
despite the fact that China herself is not yet a signatory to either
covenant.
We stand presently at the crossroads of Chinese history and I
express myself as reasonably optimistic of seeing China's
accession to the ICCPR and to the ICESCR at some stage after
June 30, 1997, but before the year 2000. Two years ago, I stuck
my neck out to predict that we are likely to see Chinese accession
to those two international covenants neither before Hong Kong's
reversion to China nor until after all the ramifications of Deng's
succession have been worked out, which now looks likely to take
place sometime later this year - possibly after the Fifteenth
Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") Congress scheduled for the
autumn. China wants, understandably, to resolve first her more
pressing problems, but the question of accession seems now to be
only a matter of time.
I make the foregoing prognosis because we know that the
question of accession to the two treaties has been debated in
internal CCP think-tanks since 1987. That debate was suspended
after 1989 but revived in the early 1990s and now has been given
added impetus by belated United States accession to the ICCPR
in 1992 and reporting thereunder to the United Nations Human
Rights Committee ("UNHRC") in 1995. These moves have left
China isolated as the only member of "P5" (Permanent Member
of the Security Council) not yet a signatory to the ICCPR. China
still has an alibi with respect to the ICESCR because the U.S. has
still not acceded the ICESCR, but I suspect we will see U.S.
accession at some stage also in the near future.
When that happens and China accedes herself to the cove-
nants, the question of reporting to the United Nations on
implementing treaty obligations in relation to Hong Kong would
be resolved once and for all. At the moment, the UNHRC takes
the view that there should be continuing reporting, either by
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China on behalf of Hong Kong or by Hong Kong reporting with
China's consent, under the terms of the ICCPR as well as the
ICESCR post-1997 on the basis that human rights supposedly
devolve with people and territory and would not be affected by
a change in sovereignty.
Now the Joint Declaration is remarkable in a second respect.
This document actually obliges China to translate the terms of the
Joint Declaration into an enforceable, domestic form. In other
words, it obliges China to draft a mini-constitution for Hong
Kong. This process began very shortly after the Joint Declaration
was made. The Joint Declaration was initialled in September
1984. It was signed by the two heads of government at a state
ceremony in Beijing in December of the same year and ratified by
Parliament in the United Kingdom the following May. In the
following month, June 1985, China established the first of two
bodies to work on the drafting process. Known as the Basic Law
Drafting Committee comprising mainland as well as Hong Kong
experts, it worked in tandem with another body known as the
Basic Law Consultative Committee established in December 1985,
thereby commencing five years of an unprecedented process of
constitutional drafting.
This was unprecedented in three senses. First of all, China has
never previously drafted a mini-constitution for any part of its
sovereign territory. Secondly, Hong Kong has never previously
had a comprehensive, modern, written constitution. Even today,
the closest equivalent we have to a written constitution is a
document known as the Letters Patent which form a badge of
office given by Her Majesty the Queen to the Governor as her
representative or plenipotentiary in Hong Kong. This is a
document one can reproduce on two sides of a foolscap. Our
edition was drafted by British Foreign Office mandarins in 1917
but with a pedigree dating back to the Nineteenth Century when,
in the heyday of Empire, the Letters Patent formed a standard,
generalized instrument for the governance of Imperial possessions.
This document empowers the Governor "to make laws for the
peace, order and good government" of the territory. It is not an
instrument particularly suited to governing a post-modern, post-
industrial society. It is certainly not an instrument with which
we would feel comfortable for governing Hong Kong after its
reversion to Chinese sovereignty. Hence, the need to undergo
this constitutional drafting process so as to translate the terms of
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the Joint Declaration into living domestic law.
The process of constitutional drafting was unprecedented in a
third sense in that Hong Kong people have never previously
participated in any such process before 1985. The five years from
1985 to 1990 formed a watershed. The Drafting Committee
comprised two-thirds Mainland and one-third Hong Kong
members. The Consultative Committee consisted 100% of Hong
Kong people whose task it was to formulate ideas and gauge
public opinion, expert as well as non-expert, and to convey the
same to the Drafting Committee for the purpose of putting pen
to paper.
In April 1990, the end-product of that seminal process being
a 160-article instrument known as the Basic Law was promulgated
by the National People's Congress of China to come into
operation as Hong Kong's mini-constitution on July 1, 1997.
This document reflects all the material provisions of the Joint
Declaration. Since Sino-British relations were actually very good
for the most part of the 1985-90 period, there was (and this is not
a well-publicized fact) considerable and very valuable British input
to the Basic Law through the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group,
being the designated official diplomatic channel through which
Britain and China communicated for the purpose of implementing
the Joint Declaration.1 This input ensured consistency between
the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration.
I do not propose to bore you with a recitation of the Basic
Law, but one point warrants emphasis, namely, 'that within the
Basic Law itself is incorporated a bill of rights known as Chapter
II of the Basic Law. This -comprises nineteen Articles, eighteen
of which spell out protection for discrete, individual forms of
human rights and civil liberties such as free expression, freedom
of association, freedom of movement, etc. The nineteenth article,
Article 39, is, arguably, the most important, the one which is
most pregnant with information..
Article 39 comprises two paragraphs. The first paragraph
provides that "[t]he provisions of the ICCPR [and] the ICESCR
... as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be
implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong Special
" See id. annex II (describing in detail the functions of the Joint Liaison
Group).
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Administrative Region." The second paragraph says that "[t]he
rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall not be
restricted unless as prescribed by law. Such restrictions shall not
contravene the provisions of the preceding paragraph of this
Article."
What does all that mean? It means that the bottom-line for
human rights protection in Hong Kong post-1997 are provisions
of the ICCPR and the ICESCR. They form a floor of minimum
standards below which human rights protection by law cannot
constitutionally fall. In other words, what we have by virtue of
Article 39 of the Basic Law is incorporation into Hong Kong's
future mini-constitution of the international standards of the two
UN treaties which confer upon Hong Kong human rights
protection encumbered by neither cultural baggage nor any Asian
bias, but is instead universalist in nature.
In 1991, Hong Kong enacted its own Bill of Rights to dovetail
with Article 39 of the Basic Law. This was a government
initiative taking four years in the gestation which started in 1987.
We looked at different bills of rights the world over, particularly
those in common law jurisdictions. We took expert advice,
particularly from Canadian judges. What we ended up doing in
1991 was to replicate almost verbatim the language of the ICCPR
as applied to Hong Kong and to make that enforceable in the
domestic context.
Of the 138 sovereign states which have now acceded to the
ICCPR, Hong Kong is unique in being the only territory that has
actually rendered the terms of the ICCPR enforceable in domestic
terms. The UN confirms that Hong Kong is unique in this
process. As we all know, countries tend to find it relatively easy
to sign up to international covenants but much more difficult to
enforce them, and they tend to get unusually sensitive when
criticized for non-compliance. Hong Kong is the only jurisdiction
that has domestically incorporated the ICCPR and, because we
have done so in a common law context, the Covenant has become
a living law for Hong Kong people, one which is interpreted by
our courts on a regular basis.
Over the course of the last six years since 1991, Hong Kong
has built up an interesting corpus of jurisprudence - interesting
because this body of case law is cultivated not just on homegrown
precedents developed in Hong Kong. On the contrary, it is
infused with case materials from all the other common law
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jurisdictions I have earlier mentioned. Additionally, we have gone
beyond the common law world in looking for persuasive
authority. We cite in our courts on regular basis decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg. We cite also
UN Human Rights Committee decisions on individual reference
under the Optional Protocol. What Hong Kong has ended up
with is a unique synthesis of homegrown and international
jurisprudence which, we are assured, is referred to with great
interest by the UN as well as by many other common law
jurisdictions around the world.
In 1995, Hong Kong enacted, with full PR.C. support, its
Court of Final Appeal statute which repatriates to Hong Kong the
power of final adjudication, the same to come into operation on
July 1, 1997. The CFA is a highly imaginative concept. It has
five seats, headed by a Chief Justice, and consists of three other
permanent judges, together with a fifth seat to be filled on an
ambulatory basis by invitees coming from one of two panels, a
Hong Kong Panel of jurists and an Overseas Panel of jurists.
On the Overseas Panel, we expect to find the most eminent
common law jurists from around the world. We are currently
assured of at least one U.S. Supreme Court Justice who has
expressed an interest in sitting on the Overseas Panel. When I
spoke last year to the Lord Chancellor of England and members
of the House of Lords Appellate Committee, every single judge
expressed an interest in sitting on the Overseas Panel. In addition,
we expect to invite also judges from Australia, New Zealand,
India, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Canada - in short, all the major
common law jurisdictions around the world. This would make
for a highly competent and cosmopolitan court which would
reflect, accurately, Hong Kong's international character. Thus,
if, for example, a maritime dispute were to reach our Court of
Final Appeal, the Chief Justice might wish to invite an Admiralty
expert from London to participate in its deliberations so as to
leaven the debate.
So far as the permanent appointees to the CFA are concerned,
there is no nationality requirement, save only for the Chief Justice
who must be a Hong Kong Chinese person with no foreign
passport or right of a abode. The other three permanent
appointees can be of any nationality, provided they are common
law lawyers. Now, if one were to survey all the major jurisdic-
tions the world over, one would be hard-pushed to identify any
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jurisdiction anywhere in the world where non-resident aliens are
given an input into the judicial process at the very highest level.
But that is the fleshing out of the vision laid down in the "one
country, two systems" doctrine.
Those are the five structures which I have thought important
to identify as foundation stones supporting the survival of the rule
of law in Hong Kong after June 30, 1997. The next question is:
where do we go from here? How does one prognosticate as to
what lies over the horizon? I believe the key to Hong Kong's
future is encapsulated in an exhortation made famous by your
thirty-fifth president, but which I shall paraphrase: Ask not what
China can do for Hong Kong; ask what Hong Kong can do for
China.
I am told, incidentally, that Kennedy's saying was not even
original: he was inspired by his old prep school Choate (whose
alumni are guaranteed entry to Harvard but not, unfortunately,
to U. Penn!) where there is an archway on which that exhortation
is emblazoned. I mention that because the real key to Hong
Kong's future lies in the fact that Hong Kong forms the interface
between China and the West - the effective bridge and communi-
cator between China and the wider world.
One is reminded of the famous debate between Mao Zedong
and Zhou Enlai in 1949 at the end of the Civil War, which saw
the Red Army triumphant throughout the Mainland. What was
interesting was that, riding on the crest of rampant nationalism,
the Red Army nevertheless stopped at Hong Kong's borders,
which is something the Nationalists would not have done. In the
Cairo Conference in 1943, a deal was struck between Roosevelt
and Chiang Kai-Shek over the objections of Churchill whereby,
come the eventual defeat of Japan, the Nationalists and not the
British would receive the surrender from Japanese forces occupy-
ing Hong Kong. That deal, though struck, was never implement-
ed. In 1949, the Red Army stopped paradoxically at Hong
Kong's borders because Mao was adamant that China needed
Hong Kong to act as its window to the outside world.
That position has not changed today. If anything, the same
has been reinforced - reinforced not just because Hong Kong still
accounts for forty percent of China's hard currency earnings, not
just because Hong Kong bankrolls China's economic moderniza-
tion, not just because Hong Kong's entrepreneurs own 4,000
factories in Guangdong's Pearl River Delta alone employing eight
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times Hong Kong's natural workforce, but, more importantly,
because Hong Kong acts as an intellectual stimulus to China. We
are not mere Medicis to China's process of modernization. Hong
Kong constitutes the living laboratory for China, holding up the
mirror to reflect what the future might hold in store for China
herself. China takes from Hong Kong what she likes or finds
useful and adapts it for her own use. Hong Kong also reminds
China of what the outside world expects of China by way of
standards of behaviour, etc. China traders know full well that
dealing with China through a Hong Kong intermediary is a much
less painful and usually more profitable option than dealing with
China directly.
In the legal sphere, this translates into a number of interesting
developments which I shall very briefly outline. Since 1987,
China has evinced a fascination with the common law as an
instrument for dispute resolution par excellence, because the
common law, with its doctrine of case precedent, is able to inject
a degree of precision and predictability to dispute resolution
which is absent from a Continental system -certainly absent from
China's own. Since 1987, at least three different law schools in
China have been studying Hong Kong law as a specialty and
translating our laws into Chinese. The Hong Kong Government
has overtaken them in this game because we have virtually
completed the translation of our pre-existing statute law into
Chinese and we draft all present and future legislation bilingually.
This means that we do not merely draft in English and translate
into Chinese, but we have two teams working in tandem
undertaking synchronized drafting. The end result is often
supplied to our mainland counterparts, not by compulsion but by
way of voluntary exchange to provide intellectual stimuli to our
northern neighbors. One of the principal recipients under this
exchange program is the National People's Congress Legislative
Affairs Commission. It is scarcely surprising that should you look
at China's Bankruptcy Law or companies legislation as well as
bits and pieces of China's commercial law, you will find Hong
Kong's fingerprints all over the place.
At the regional level, the role of mentor which Hong Kong
plays is even more striking. Shenzhen, which lies immediately
across from our land border, was the first of the Special Economic
Zones ("SEZ") so designated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. In 1992,
Shenzhen was the first of the SEZs to be given legislative
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autonomy. What that meant was that since 1992, Shenzhen was
empowered through its own Shenzhen People's Congress to pass
laws different and separately from the rest of the country. Since
1992, Shenzhen has enacted over 250 pieces of primary and
subsidiary legislation of which two-thirds come from Hong Kong
sources with our blessing and our cooperation, and with no charge
for copyright royalties! The Shenzhen authorities like this system
- in fact, they appreciate it so much that a dialogue is underway
between the Shenzhen Government and the Hong Kong Govern-
ment for the training of lawyers of the Shenzhen People's
Congress in legislative drafting techniques by the Attorney
General's Chambers In Hong Kong. This is a program which I
anticipate will become a reality after June 30, 1997.
Let me take another example from a different source. In
Easter 1996, we were invited to inaugurate the opening of the
Guangdong People's Procuracy Training Center. Now procura-
tors in China are akin to district attorneys in the United States.
They investigate as well as prosecute crimes. After the training
center was opened, we were invited to deliver a series of lectures
on Hong Kong's criminal justice system. We did so, focusing on
such stock common law concepts as the presumption of inno-
cence, the burden of proof, the rules of evidence, the rules of
procedure and so on, at the end of which the Training Center was
so impressed that they asked us to incorporate our materials into
their standard training curriculum and also to receive their
trainees in Hong Kong to observe our legal system in action.
And because we now have trials conducted at every level of our
courts in either English or Chinese, Hong Kong is able to
demonstrate to Guangdong the common law in operation in a
language which minimizes the barriers to communication. Since
the inauguration of this program in the late spring of 1996, we
have played host to eight delegations from Guangdong Province
alone.
You may query, rightly, why China should be so interested in
Hong Kong's criminal justice system? Is not theirs so very
different? The answer is interesting because in March 1996, the
National People's Congress promulgated a new Criminal
Procedure Law to come into operation on January 1, 1997. This
law introduced for the first time not merely in the history of the
P.R.C. but in 4000 years of Chinese history, the notion of
presumption of innocence for the accused in criminal proceedings,
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puts the burden of proof in criminal cases on the state, restricts
the right of administrative detention to fourteen days in general
cases and thirty-seven days in serious cases, which gives China the
idea of habeas corpus as a notion. Further, the ten-month hiatus
between promulgation and implementation of the law afforded an
opportunity both for learning by lawyers and procurators in
China and for the Attorney General's Chambers in Hong Kong
to play a role in the provision of necessary training.
Yet, perhaps a more interesting question is why China
changed its Criminal Procedure Law at all? Part of the answer or
part of the credit goes to three Englishmen who spent August
1995 in Beijing, namely, an English High Court Judge who is a
criminal trial specialist, Mr. Justice Anthony Hooper, a former
Chairman of the English Bar who is a Queen's Counsel specializ-
ing in criminal trial advocacy Mr. Robert Seabrook, Q.C., and
one of the editors of Archbold's Criminal Pleading, Evidence and
Practice, the leading criminal practitioners' Bible in England and
also in Hong Kong. In the summer of 1995, these three were
flown out from London to Beijing where they spent two weeks
advising the NPC Legislative Affairs Commission on how to
revamp China's criminal procedure law.
As we behold the fruits of their labors, we see explode an oft-
held myth that China is only interested in modernizing her
economic law but not her public or criminal law. I believe the
reality to be vastly different since any country that has undergone
double digit real growth for ten consecutive years is a nation
transformed. And the law of unintended consequences dictates
that, like it or not, changes have to be brought about to meet the
demands and expectations of a population which now lives in a
stakeholders' economy. These include demands for enhanced
protection of property as well as personal rights, resulting in the
same approximating with rising domestic expectations and
international standards.
Allow me to give you a final example. Two weeks ago I was
in Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province in Southwest China,
which is fast establishing itself as the focal point of Sino-Thai-
Burmese three-way trade. I enjoyed a dialogue with the Chief
Justice of the Kunming Intermediate People's Court, Mr. Sun
Shaohong, whom I sought to interest in a project which has now
sold like hotcakes throughout all the cities of China, which I
visited this spring from Guangzhou to our immediate north,
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through to Shanghai and Beijing and beyond the Great Wall to
Dalian in former Manchuria, which is the entrepot for Sino-
Japanese-Korean threeway trade.
The experimental project which I proposed is to set up a
model court in each of these centers of commerce so as to
demonstrate the modalities of common law litigation, using
Putonghua as a medium of instruction, using real-life Hong Kong
as well as real-life P.R.C. case materials, using judges, prosecutors
and defense counsel from Hong Kong as legal players and, most
importantly of all, inviting P.R.C. judges, procurators, private
sector lawyers and law professors to sit as members of a jury.
The exercise would involve working through the case material,
allowing the jury to deliberate and return a verdict, whereafter a
post-mortem or workshop would be held to assess the results and
move up the learning curve.
The Kunming judiciary reacted with enthusiasm. They
informed me that they had not played host to a visiting legal
delegation since 1986. It transpired that in 1986 a group of
Californian judges visited Kunming and set up a model court to
demonstrate the merits of the Californian jury system, in English
of course, using California case materials. And that exchange in
1986 - which was just one exchange in eleven years - had the
effect of changing the Kunming judicial system by persuading the
adjudicative committee to adopt the principle of unanimous
verdicts in finding guilt in criminal cases as opposed to their
former practice which allowed for majority verdicts.
I cite the foregoing piece of anecdotal evidence by way of
illustration of what engagement as a policy might achieve. I do
so because, at the end of the day, the crucial issue in current
American foreign relations - one which will remain central for
years to come - is whether containment or engagement consti-
tutes the right policy to modulate U.S.-China relations. Indeed,
U.S.-China relations are likely to remain the most pressing and
important foreign policy topic for the first decade of the Twenty-
First Century and possibly beyond. As members of a distin-
guished and intelligent audience, I leave it to you, ladies and
gentlemen, to supply the critical answer to that question.
But I conjured up the foregoing example to illuminate the
crucial role Hong Kong must play in China's historic process of
late Twentieth Century modernization so as to demonstrate that,
at the end of the day, 1997 generates two-way traffic - from
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China to Hong Kong and back. The commonplace media
treatment of the drama of 1997, often portrayed as that of a
communist monolith swallowing whole the free market enclave
of Hong Kong is hopelessly simplistic. The truth is vastly more
complex and may be more accurately analogized as a two-way
street, in other words, as a matter of managing the transition both
from the incoming sovereign's point of view as well as from that
of Hong Kong bidding to maintain its autonomy. In this
unprecedented experiment, Hong Kong will act in partnership
with China, albeit as junior partners in an historic joint venture.
Hong Kong, in today's reality as well as in Mao's vision back in
1949, remains the natural interface between China and the outside
world. This simple fact emerges, at the end of the day, as the
final guarantor of Hong Kong's survival and prosperity beyond
1997.
Thank you very much.
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